

Nure

2-05

NUC BOOK

## Anti-prolif loop

survey

anti-Casualty (Casualty?)  
CANDOUR

my contact:

We've <sup>US</sup> been willing to <sup>A</sup> accept any  
restraint on US develop, (test), production,  
spread or use. (or inspection in US?)  
i.e. the obvious essential prerequisite  
to <sup>B</sup> an improved restraint on SU / Russia.

Thus, A has always been higher priority  
than B, blocking B

appears otherwise (e.g. Bunker plan)  
is truly a loop.

see rejection of CANDOUR; New Look <sup>major intel - probab + Korea:</sup>  
(capture SU, 1991? <sup>Britain's</sup> <sup>Power</sup>)

Nothing is more recent, determinate, than

see H2 and  
SU, 1933?

2/ foreign dangers of further loss of  
Korea - by ~~US~~ US, followed by SU

b) opportunities for agents (+ others)  
US-SU esp

c) Internal relocations to agree + agents  
(see scheme of the Dams as VA - incl Nure  
(Crest, Office, etc.) Kilpatrick Stemmer '56  
Johnson '65 (REF)



d) US acceptance of, knowledge of, and to  
proof by attos:

French use of text

(lover, saved?!)

(Base French male)

David. Tent

unnecessary —  
or would this?

Virtual cap.: paper, heavy

May: 80's

Don - Shark

(to show "stunt of ontology" manifest a promise to US?) So says Selig Harrison 2-15-05

(N. bentley?) (Coburn)

(See my leaf & continuous study of Hiroshima  
Memories — vol. S. B.

Which country has even worsened his relations with US by putting arms?

Next SC: CW was on 4/9 - after Berlin Crisis '48

not UK; (France? not from US)

NOT CHINA; <sup>(see 69772)</sup> Israel; India/Pak (border)  
Tests (North Korea?)

1964-65

Prospect is dangerous: China (US, SW); frag

after Kuwait; how now?



New data:

Delegation

Renettmoens

SU in Cuba

(1980 from crisis - Carter!

✱

Faint strike plans - 1961

fear of leaks/WB

Sziland 45 Pittman 45

(a) on danger

Rotblat 44

(Frank) Reinhardt

Clinton?

(b) opportunity  
on to court - Adelson - Delmontal Plan

(<sup>us. H</sup>)

Clement, Office 49-50

office entered

Delmontal, " " 52 <sup>us. H</sup> testing

Burn (Biter)

fine  
1951: no proposal  
for new ~~test~~  
opinion?

no "Frank Report"?

WHP NOT?

McGarity? (Korea?)

Testing 1956

Tell, RAND

1960-62

" "

(1961 - no proposal for new opinion?)

1961-62: What & could  
have told!

(in SU: Sakharov - <sup>us.</sup> 58/100 MT

GILPATRIC 1964-65

"MAD" - play of McN vs. USAF: FS cap. (MIRV, ABM)

(see Kist - <sup>us.</sup> "channels" / see McN Barin - Chinese ABM:



JFK in 1961 (Lass)

McA/LBJ vs. new way with China  
from late-1964 to 1968

Chinese  
(I wanted ~~China~~ help vs. DRV

did all hope - from mid-69 on, to  
reverse China stand back from war of  
was in NVN?!

Chinese

(He didn't propose otherwise  
to provoke China (?)

until JCS 1964-1968

as in Laos 1960-61-62

" 1949-50-51

i) " Superiority can be maintained "

ii) it's worth it

iii) it's essential - at cost  
of our rule + profit

iv) it's very profitable for America  
(see 1961/Ball!)  
like in Laos, to LBJ

and for polo,  
in WH, Congress

known in: Polk

(UK?)

SO

(France? France? etc.)

(unlike - it turned out -  
monopoly (just used  
in Berlin - though

it didn't help in Korea  
in 1950-51 (did it?)

the thought it's done in  
Korea, + Quebec

known used in Indochina  
at Germany and after

(see Warh Post in 1952)

TN Diplomacy (since 1951-52/54)

(see Har)

see FVA e-mail on grants



2-15-04

NUC Book

Book is prepared — with testing + development  
+ think —

to give up NPT

to give up ABMT + CTB (already)

to accelerate deployment (+ testing) in China

France

India

(China)

Japan?

South Korea

Russia

(big winners?)

back to MIRV

to force inspectors (NPT over)

and meanwhile: to give up and to Russia  
on control of weapons

to force pressure on Pak, on Khan

to ~~refer to~~ begin NK out of program

or to press Saudi to give up weapons (deployed)  
along with Iran, ME (inspectors)

(Pak

Egypt

(Who besides Libya might give up arms?)

Saudi? Egypt? (not Pak; or India (China)

Iran? (ban of US) (Iraq?!) )



NK BOOK

Selected III US "strat. sup." <sup>US</sup> <sup>into</sup>  
multilateralism all being: "need" for US FS cap  
+ oil + dollars (CME)  
FU threats

Selected I:

Eye I

Q: to:

retal  
retal

SU opponent everywhere

SU = with (no roots)

Human cap.

Barbaric Rep

H. bomb

Missile Rep

Selected II: Prerequisite for empire: Iran, ME, Berlin;

Air: "2nd strike D-2"

[note: VSCF - sec: FS

Dominic Theory

minut SU superiority

" " FS cap

divided Germany;

dislocation all + more

Famine

Japan

sphere for

Japan, not

China threat

(real threat: strat. power!)

NATO

SU 175 divs (for NATO)

SU threat to West Europe

SU ABM cap

"Need" for US protection of Europe

SS-20

SU creating cap on CTB

(We ignore MRBMs/IRBMs)

FS threat of Cuban missiles

need for Trood (no. SU FS cap.)

(Deliberate instability - to maintain credible threat)



What I was trying to do

PALs

WJ did Kargan → Altus

Press this?

Am Ambros

Press control

no cities

Enthous?

end war

reserves  
CS

To put down French?

no Moscow

(French + US ~~DO~~ (in 1961-62)

(no deaps)

hard to target cities!

no delegation

NFU

I wanted Press to control (to get PALs on;

(NATO

in theory, JCS control would suffice for this)

Berlin

JFK wanted US control. Both wanted "options"

Kilpatrick influenced:

and I wanted to

we could defend Berlin with EU

save China + cities

was without fear of what

~~was~~ 1st or 2d strike;

or etc

20M KIA so losses will

(probably not true,

to 600M (+ New Writers:

dispute on Rep.!

I would have permitted).

didn't seem to me

we FS planning at the same time!

(VFR-McC-McN surely didn't believe it! (?)

(Kargan?

Roskin?

(I told (Wizards) - being heard from Roskin?



I still suspect of concern, my intentions  
and my efforts

and note  
seems  
real  
opportunities

after Sept '61  
for our control

But I strongly suspect not taking a different <sup>WB</sup> path  
I take no pride in what I accomplished,  
if anything

At the time, I thought that was more  
than it probably was

(Almost no one knew what I had done <sup>at all</sup>  
at all; it looked like a lot,  
considering who I was (for one zealot  
to do — <sup>along with</sup> some guys for Kampen,  
Trisel, McKenny, Entbarn (earlier, AWW, bsc)

It may have been nothing —

and it may have been less than others  
(e.g. Kilpatrick?)

And in some ways it <sup>may have</sup> ~~probably~~  
under things were

(FS plans? Kilpatrick → GIL)  
still, they were better than SROP! (Pat)

(I thought if ever I'd come in 1962 — in later —  
I might have saved China, and my cities  
(prob. not Moscow!)



NUC Book

Be ~~not~~

PA + ~~Bar~~

(like friends.)

Caths + ~~chilbury~~

US ~~8~~ Kraguland

limits of det (I + II)

Control

"Survival" (self-detracting  
behavior)

limits of "noticed" behavior

Delegation

Humility = ~~debatable~~ selective cover

mostly weak or zero

Can be manip or provoked

\* let negative

toward anal. "silly"

or Respect

Shifting Negatives:

Self Comp Forg...

has

high bar Non-nots



NVC BOOK

US air that required FU threat

Europe; ME; VN/SVN (China, 1946-49? need for US troops, too?  
see Korea 1950-51 (why not used, or?) which required superiority

Threatened? why force MIA? → N 1968-69 (why did Reagan recall Perry?)  
Why wasn't for the, 1952 (MIA)-53 { KS-D-2

Did (not) China (Machuan Theory  
are for news? Possible

{ NO SU PS D-L Super II  
no SU FU threat

how US air that precluded

effective air control

(or Min Det: unilateral  
limits

and effective non-prolif

(under current conditions

prote-CW

(is "abortion" really still possible?

(Even?)

Limits of det: in Cuba

yet K didn't tell us — so is <sup>therefore</sup>

of weakness or delegation  
or lack of control of AA!



Anti-prolif has had the same priority  
and focus as anti-drugs

Pretty for same reason:

count USG relations (conflicting axis)  
with proliferators

drugs: China

Kao - Vay Pao

SVN

Afghans/Paks

Contras/Honduras

Noriega

again, Afghans/Paks

Mafia

(see secret deals - torture - with  
Syria, now.

---

US give missions that require credible  
FO threats or, possibly, use  
(threat worked in Lebanon: Geneva  
and '50's  
and on Berlin

Suez: did SU threat work, or not?

Gulf War: probably yes. Iraq: not needed -  
SH "threat" of CW/BW didn't work; nor did shaming.



Vs. "rat." - calculating consequences  
on independent judgment of  
options, consequences, pros/cons, values...

(note: given by authority ("social beliefs  
or groups

or distinctions

or "honor / promise / obligation

Different effects of breaking a promise

or a threat

either may be "survived"  
if carried out

or

threatened

("The Muckler") promise should "never" be a bluff

Fidelis:

General honor understood that a threat (saying in poker!)  
may be bluff ("honorably" analyze

VIV - appeal to Honor ("agreement!"  
"commitment")

(de Gaulle does conclude from C-II: Turkey  
don't depend on US "promise"

or was it US-UK relation: Skysault/  
VERK help to French came after that! Poland  
see my feelings about Turk deal!

(I thought "K has to break down -  
rationally!"

I was not deterred from conventional attack, 610 (CB)  
OR 32 MRBM / IRBM.



Oct: "suicidal" response to V/humiliation  
is always possible.

Type II can never be "perfect"

nor can Type II - e.g. a NWS  
is attached conventionally  
(see frag in Gulf War)

even if FU/FS is  
"suicidal"

(can both sides have some <sup>NWS</sup> Type II - yes (?)  
may be "provoked" (if conventional attack  
or if limited war FU)  
into FU, FS or etc

We wanted Type II so strong that  
SU could not cred. threaten to respond  
to limited FU or its allies or itself

Resisting to Hacked

one can have  
this at low levels,  
"cheap" - but  
M/C doesn't prefer that.

and to deprecate SU of FU/FS threats  
(or of less - than - suicidal retal to  
US ~~then~~ FS (no SU D-L:

threat of  
instability, loss of  
control - medium

make then FS certainly totally suicidal  
and does, not  
(Bilateral)

(WAR: What is now? But if we sought it and approved to



2-16-05

HUC BOOK

Strange Love

America's ~~Real~~ Fatal Chinese Information with ~~Sturgeon~~ Boring  
Attraction to Nuclear Weapons  
Threats

|| No American Pres has been willing to take  
responsibility for lowering the credibility of  
American threats to initiate ~~the~~ nuclear warfare  
to propose steps... to press... and to cause deliberate policy  
(even those - R' - who have privately  
believed that to carry out any such threat  
would be at best a totally unacceptable risk.

(see McN, Gensolinsky... McN to  
my NATO speech (do I have it? Sean Chas speech.  
Efforts to get NATO off it -  
see NATO planning...

Am. Action/Action...

NFU issue

History...

Brookings

Here threats were to: keep NVN north of 17th Parallel  
in August 1954 and after

(conventionally: it worked)

(or simply (VCS?) allow us to  
attack China -  
without holding off SU)

and (VCS) Chinese north of DRV

even if US ---

interested

and get DRV to withdraw NVA... (N) or refrain from  
1972 advice - or order



2-16-05

Who came up with name, Dr. Stengeler?

Hans, only?

How did script evolve?

What's right

Is Peter Heege (Bergman?) alive?

Teller book is wrong on HAK + HK

Madness (Amen)

MAD is mad - as is everything else

"Fools, Schisms, Madness of Crowds":

even one so suicidal?

see Watercraft Trials

forever

Circumstances

(was?)

WWI?

(see court trial

of man who stalled car on tracks)

Intone ~~showed~~ a little recklessness

but not "madness"

WWI? (2 years later?)

(Was anti-Semite essential to Nazis winning

power? or Hitler's aggressiveness? (No)

Russia was also big error (like Napoleon)

Could he have been stopped

Or did paper "mad" to

(to his generals)?

attack Pearl?!



No country has ever had a credible  
FC<sup>or WMD</sup> threat against US, for anything  
we've actually done

[Iraq would have, if they'd had WMD's!  
SU, China didn't use it

Now (?) with a 2d-use threat  
for a limited US war

But FC is credible against invasion  
— or even heavy attacks (Korea War, Iraq)  
even though it's suicidal.

(What if we had known (or felt  
very confident — as if WMD's) that Suez  
was behind 9-11! as public threats!  
as serious threats! ~

We wanted <sup>to keep</sup> us that, since we  
UK/Edu wanted an threat in 1928!

Did Comint + allies realize that we were not  
just to deter our attacks OR violation of  
Europe ("100 countries"!)

(Korea & allies in 1951!)

Two use



July 45 - test real potential of destroying  
life

(see S/GP - new winter unknown)

Bomb test - 3 x predicted

Mile 2 x predicted

C-II: obligation

AA

W/ not just put

SU troops on Cuba

and answer it?

(We couldn't attack!)

or answer warheads?

||| (K had promised not to  
cause trouble before election!

(too was could not be attacked -

was way to prevention!  
stop invasion!

But also - balance! (points)

Turkey - spoke  
there?

(We could put as many in  
Turkey, or Europe!)

I think us. Japan - not needed, probably

But think us. SU - needed. cost in pop. loss?  
who control?

(Stalin calls Khrushchev after Hiro, but I think - no?)



It's now clear to me that



NOC BOOK

2-05

Highly logic

than what "message"

under-rates & undervalues of protection, or "control"  
(of signals, offers, threats)

Nothing guarantees a NWS will not respond to  
(what it sees as a provocation) with  
a new attack

(OBC - but see, SH) (CIA)

Not does conf. of responding with a new vital  
guarantee that a NWS will not be attacked, either

Thus, FC threats can be credible (enough)  
or against a NWS or

"det I" (or II) is not automatically  
reliable for a NWS... proof. doesn't  
or an ally of a NWS (esp., of SU: "inferior"  
to US).

without good prospect "Sup." allows NWS (US) to make  
of disarming <sup>all-out</sup> attacks  
~~limited~~ attacks on superior NWS  
FC threats against NWS or its ally.

with NWS (after it has learned consequences are degraded,  
FC vs. your ally) is very dangerous:

not very credible:  
FC can be ordered off, "super" to drive the NWS -  
what can be ordered off, then the guarantee response will what



2-17-05

Then, threats of US FCU vs. NVN dial  
note (I believe) was much risk of  
new Madonna (or, say, vs. Berlin) from SU  
of China.

Kickin, vs. China (all-out).

(But - precedent of FCU

denial of VCS; HAK? N? (probably)  
(not??) "

note, by JFK, LBJ (Ker? in 1965, allegedly  
out of office

N, yes: in, out, in

Complicated? Not that much - for you.

(Pols don't own on strategies like

this: pool, billiards, checkers, poker.

Crazy? Yes! Playing with fire - or nitro

(crushing percussion caps with teeth)

When McN + McS say, "no war at all,  
no consideration...")

If we arguing against VCS drive

to comp threats out...

JFK  
he pretended  
(bluffed) not to be

determined of risk (=!!) of

SU wars on Berlin + Turkey

he pretended to be  
willing to lose / test

FCU threats

If used threats, whether or not

if admitted it to themselves

(see 1961 - including me! it!

and 1962 wrt Berlin, Turkey: If

JFK didn't think FCU threats would work! But the dial



New Book

2-13-65

Then US FC plans are are plans  
for crimes against humanity  
in the eyes of most UN members.  
and in most cases, massive war crimes

Probs (+ plus) are a conspiracy to commit  
(? at a time + place + under  
circumstances uncertain

nevertheless, prob. for mass murder)

World Court: ... unless, perhaps, necessary  
to preserve integrity, survival,  
independence of nations.

(NATO plans, Pak? Israel?

Punishment? "India"

(2d stage: <sup>Det.</sup> captured for use  
or BW/CW attack?

World Court opinion?

But STOP (+ Russian STOP) (What are  
French plans?  
Israeli?!

see South Africa?  
Pak?

(Clarke article)

STOP is a plan for the greatest crime  
against humanity in history =

(What of: Doomsday machine — as crime  
see Russian Deal Hand!

K obligation in C-II?

What of a non-automatic  
Doomsday machine?

US lack of PACS, obligation  
TRIDENTS, now  
about

New Winter System? see York



2-10-05

New Book

49th  
Conferences

A Chronicle of  
Madness -

A Memoir of the  
New Era

Government Home  
Mod

Notes:

Responding to

Evil

NO

Chava: Resistance?

to Civil War

Responding